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For years after the end of the Cold War, it was possible to offer an optimistic 
assessment of a general trend towards disarmament when it came to describing the 
future of chemical and nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons had been abandoned 
by most militaries and were largely decoupled from world politics. When they 
were occasionally used, these anomalies seemed to confirm their limited military 
utility. Any chemical weapons use generated international condemnation and, in 
some cases, even counter-measures.1 Nuclear weapons seemed to be following a 
similar path.2 On balance, nuclear arsenals were shrinking. They benefited from 
only limited modernization efforts, and in some cases began to suffer serious 
operational glitches owing to a lack of attention to detail. Nuclear weapons also 
seemed to be playing a gradually diminishing role in war planning and diplomacy.
Recent developments, however, make it difficult to continue to adhere to 
this assessment. The use of chemical weapons by both state and non-state actors 
suggests that the idea that these agents lacked any useful purpose might have been 
largely a matter of context, and that this context is changing. The fact that the 
greatest disarmament setbacks have occurred in the realm of chemical weapons, 
the realm that previously saw the greatest success, is cause for serious concern. 
Emerging fears about a return to Great Power competition3 also raise the spectre 
of renewed development of nuclear arsenals, and potential efforts to link recent 
advances in precision guidance or even cyber operations to nuclear deterrents and 
policies. Hence, the international nuclear context seems to be changing too. 
Although the reasons for this loss of optimism are not controversial, useful 
insights might be gained by chronicling how the possibility of optimism came 
* This article is part of a special issue of International Affairs ( July 2019) on ‘Re-visioning war and the state in the 
twenty-first century’, guest-edited by Tracey German.
1 Davis B. Ottaway, ‘US decries Iraqi use of chemical weapons’, Washington Post, 24 March 1988, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/24/us-decries-iraqi-use-of-chemical-weapons/4421ebe8-df59-
477d-882b-7d381f3a1868/?utm_term=.a3ccda2dad33. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs 
cited in this article were accessible on 30 May 2019.) Counter-proliferation objectives were significant elements 
in the First Gulf War and the sanctions regime against Iraq: see Jason D. Ellis, ‘The best defense: counterpro-
liferation and US national security’, Washington Quarterly 26: 2, Spring 2003, pp. 115–33.
2 Trevor McCrisken and Maxwell Downman, ‘“Peace through strength”: Europe and NATO deterrence 
beyond the US Nuclear Posture Review’, International Affairs 95: 2, March 2019, pp. 277–96.
3 Nana de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘US–China relations and the liberal world order: contending 
elites, contending visions?’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 113–32; Christopher Layne, ‘The US–
China power shift and the end of Pax Americana’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 89-112.
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about in the first place. This article accordingly begins by making the case that 
developments in nuclear policies were actually on the side of the angels. Indeed, it 
states, one could even have argued that the international community was coming 
closer to treating nuclear weapons in the same manner as it treated chemical 
weapons, which had largely vanished from world politics by the turn of the 
century. The article then goes on to explore why the chemical weapons success 
story ended, and what its end might portend for the role of nuclear weapons in 
world politics.
The sources of optimism: nuclear weapons
The end of the Cold War did not abruptly eliminate national justifications for 
or interest in maintaining a nuclear arsenal or policies of nuclear deterrence, but 
it did immediately raise questions about exactly how much nuclear deterrence 
was necessary to guarantee national security following the end of the Soviet–US 
rivalry. In both the United States and Russia, nuclear modernization programmes 
were either terminated or greatly reduced, the pace of treaty-mandated nuclear 
arms reductions and retirements was accelerated, and various weapons were retired 
and various operational practices suspended. On 27 September 1991, for instance, 
US President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would destroy 
all ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons deployed overseas and would 
no longer routinely deploy tactical nuclear weapons on warships.4 In response 
to these so-called ‘Presidential Nuclear Initiatives’, Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev reciprocated with a series of actions including removing nuclear 
warheads from air defence missiles and eliminating nuclear artillery munitions.5 
These actions reflected a shared perception that the risks entailed by certain kinds 
of nuclear deployments and practices could no longer be justified by the dimin-
ishing threat. There was an immediate effort to remove nuclear weapons from 
‘general purpose forces’. To put the point somewhat differently, it became increas-
ingly easy to imagine ‘what might go wrong’ if nuclear weapons continued to 
be married to functional air defence weapons, for instance, and those kinds of 
concerns increasingly outweighed the rapidly diminishing threat of attack.
Efforts were also undertaken—and I acknowledge the risk here of offering an 
oxymoron—to make strategic nuclear weapons safer. In 1991 the United States 
de-alerted its strategic bomber force by no longer loading nuclear weapons on 
bombers during routine peacetime operations, so-called ‘day-alert’ status.6 US 
4 Nearly 30 years later, it is safe to assume that tactical nuclear weapons have been permanently removed from 
the US Navy.
5 Susan J. Koch, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992, case study no. 5 (Washington DC: Center for the 
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, 2012).
6 Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Bush’s ARM plan; and for the B-52s, the alert is finally over’, New York Times, 29 Sept. 
1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/29/world/bush-s-arm-plan-and-for-the-b-52-s-the-alert-is-finally-
over.html. Provisions of the 1993 START II Treaty seemed to create a de facto agreement to de-alert the 
US bomber force by specifying a minimum 100 km distance between bomber bases, which can house both 
conventional and nuclear-capable bombers, and nuclear storage facilities. The provision was included to 
prevent rapid upload of nuclear weapons to declared non-nuclear bombers, but in practice it would have 
separated nuclear-capable bombers from their payloads on a day-alert basis. See art. IV of Treaty between 
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ballistic missiles on day-alert status were also targeted on remote ocean areas, 
greatly mitigating the consequences of an accidental missile launch. In 2015, 
the US State Department publicly acknowledged that the United States had no 
‘launch on warning’ doctrine, although it could launch the nuclear force while 
under attack following multi-phenomenal indications that the nation was in fact 
under nuclear assault.7 Although there was a brief flurry of press reporting in 2017 
about refurbishing infrastructure to support a return to an alert bomber force by 
rearming bombers with nuclear payloads in peacetime,8 and long-time disarma-
ment advocates continue to decry ‘hair trigger’ alert postures, operational actions 
have been undertaken to ‘safe’ the US strategic nuclear force. While the potential 
for accidents can never be completely eliminated, obvious steps were taken to 
reduce both the likelihood and the consequences of a nuclear mishap.
Although the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was never ratified by the US 
Senate, other nuclear-capable states—with the exception of India, Pakistan and 
North Korea—have abided by this de facto nuclear moratorium since the People’s 
Republic of China last tested a nuclear weapon in 1996.9 Other states have actually 
relinquished their nuclear weapons. South Africa abandoned its nuclear arsenal and 
associated infrastructure in the early 1990s, while Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakh-
stan turned their backs on their Soviet nuclear legacy by shipping nuclear weapons 
back to Moscow and joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon 
states.10 International counter-proliferation efforts also succeeded in ending 
nuclear weapons programmes in Iraq and Libya.11 As Tanya Ogilvie-White and 
David Santoro noted, there are sources of optimism in this record: the nuclear 
dragon might just ‘have one eye closed’ as it slowly dozes off to sleep.12
Over the long term, and despite the reassurances given by proponents of 
the US Stockpile Stewardship Program, the testing moratorium will also have 
a cumulative negative impact on the ability of states to construct and maintain 
sophisticated nuclear weapons or weapons based on new physical principles, 
designs or materials. The test ban sends a message to those inside the US nuclear 
complex. As one blue-ribbon commission noted in the 1990s, doubt had emerged 
within the nuclear workforce about the continuation of US deterrent capabili-
ties and policies, given the moratorium on nuclear testing and on the design and 
the United States of American and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (START II TREATY), https://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/start2/START2text.htm. 
7 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, US nuclear force posture and de-alerting, 14 Dec. 2015, 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/ris/250644.htm.
8 Marcus Weisgerber, ‘Exclusive: US preparing to put bombers back on 24-hour alert’, Defense One, 22 Oct. 
2017, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2017/10/exclusive-us-preparing-put-bombers-back-24-hour-
alert/141957/.
9 Seth Faison, ‘China sets off nuclear test, then announces moratorium’, New York Times, 30 July 1996, https://
www.nytimes.com/1996/07/30/world/china-sets-off-nuclear-test-then-announces-moratorium.html.
10 Stephen F. Burgess and Togzhan Kassenova, ‘The rollback states’, in Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, 
Slaying the nuclear dragon: disarmament dynamics in the twenty-first century (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
2012), pp. 85–117. 
11 Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear physics: why Iraq and Libya failed to build nuclear weapons (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2016); Constance Duncombe, ‘Twitter and transformative diplomacy: social media 
and Iran–US relations’, International Affairs 93: 3, May 2017, pp. 545–62.
12 Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, ‘The nuclear dragon’, in Ogilvie-White and Santoro, Slaying the 
nuclear dragon, p. 305.
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construction of new weapons: ‘In spite of public declarations by national leaders, 
we found a high degree of skepticism ...  about the nation’s long-term commit-
ment to nuclear weapons programs.’13 What the so-called Chiles Commission 
suggested was that nuclear scientific, technical, engineering and operational 
expertise was a living art, and that this art was in decline. As scientists and 
engineers retired, it became difficult to sustain this living art, especially as young 
people looked to more promising and exciting occupations. The Russians faced 
an even more precipitous collapse of their nuclear infrastructure at the end of the 
Cold War, although an iron triangle of church, military and political leaders has 
since emerged to create a sort of ‘stockpile stewardship program’ with a decidedly 
‘Russian’ cultural flavour.14
An odd combination of concern about the deterioration of the US nuclear 
infrastructure and a further reduction in US reliance on nuclear weapons in the 
country’s National Security Strategy was apparent in the Nuclear Posture Reviews 
undertaken by both the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama administrations.15 
Although the Bush administration was roundly criticized for its interest in devel-
oping ‘boutique’ nuclear weapons in response to changing target sets (as evident in 
its request for funds for a study of the requirements for a robust earth-penetrating 
nuclear warhead), it also proposed a ‘New Triad’ that had the effect of reducing 
the role of nuclear weapons in the US strategic deterrent: this called for more 
reliance on conventional weapons and strategic defences, along with maintaining 
a robust nuclear infrastructure.16 The Obama administration embraced the ‘New 
Triad’ concept while going one step further than Bush by adopting nuclear disar-
mament as the long-term objective animating US nuclear doctrine and policy.17 
The Obama Nuclear Posture Review also made the case that the new US disarma-
ment/deterrence policy had to be supported by increased funding to respond to 
the continued deterioration of the US nuclear weapons scientific and industrial 
infrastructure in order to certify the safety and functioning of its nuclear arsenal, 
which would incentivize other nuclear powers to continue reductions in their 
own nuclear forces. The Bush and Obama administrations, and now the Donald 
J. Trump administration, all faced the same issue: that is, how to ensure that the 
US nuclear enterprise—and domestic political support for maintaining nuclear 
deterrence as a national defence strategy—did not decline faster than the need for 
a nuclear arsenal. For decades, US nuclear policies have been based on a delicate 
balancing act, given the vast sums of funding involved and limited interest in 
nuclear deterrence as a national priority. 
13 Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise, 1 March 1999, p. 25, https://
www.breckenridgeinstitute.com/1999-CHILES-COMMISSION-REPORT.pdf.
14 Dmitry Adamsky, Russian nuclear orthodoxy: religion, politics, and strategy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2019).
15 For a comparison of the two Nuclear Posture Reviews, see James J. Wirtz, ‘Nuclear politics: the political 
decision to acquire, sustain or discard a nuclear arsenal’, in Robert Rauchhaus, Mathew Kroenig and Erik 
Gartzke, eds, Causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 149–51.
16 Joseph F. Pilat, ‘The New Triad’, in James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds, Nuclear transformation: the new 
US nuclear doctrine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 41–52. 
17 Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, April 2010), www.defense.gov/npr/
docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.
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By the turn of the century, nuclear forces were no longer surrounded by the 
glamour and professionalism once associated with the Strategic Air Command. 
For instance, those graduating at the bottom of their class at the US Air Force 
Academy were designated as missileers,18 a signal that was difficult to ignore. 
Operational forces also began to suffer glitches. On 29 August 2007, six cruise 
missiles armed with W80 nuclear warheads were inadvertently carried on a B52-H 
bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force 
Base in Louisiana. For 36 hours, the weapons remained unprotected by required 
security protocols; the resulting investigation revealed that many personnel failed 
to follow nuclear handling procedures. Numerous personnel actions ensued, 
including the resignations of the Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff.19 The 
United States had actually lost negative command and control of these nuclear 
weapons. The turmoil from this incident was still going on when it was revealed 
that at some time in late 2006, the Defense Logistics Agency mistakenly shipped 
fuses used in the nose cone of US Minuteman III intercontinental missile to 
Taiwan. When the Taiwanese discovered the mistake in March 2008, the then 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered the Air Force and Navy secretaries ‘to 
conduct a comprehensive review of all policies, procedures, as well as a physical 
site inventory of all nuclear and nuclear-associated material equipment across their 
respective programs’.20 
The Department of Defense task force on nuclear weapons management offered 
an assessment of the deterioration in the ability of the Air Force to accomplish its 
nuclear mission in a report to Secretary Gates dated 12 September 2008. It offered 
a concise summary of how the deterioration of the ‘sociology’ in the nuclear 
enterprise was undermining its effectiveness:
The post-Cold War environment, the implementation of arms control treaties, attenua-
tion of the nuclear alert posture, and the priority assigned to the conventional and space 
missions led the Air Force to give markedly less attention and fewer resources to the 
nuclear enterprise. The result was five broad accelerating trends:
1. Nuclear missions became embedded in organizations whose primary focus is not nuclear;
2. Overwhelming emphasis was given to conventional operations;
3. The grade levels of personnel in line and staff appointments whose daily business 
involved nuclear weapons were lowered;
4. The nuclear mission and those who performed it were generally devalued; and
5. There was no single command to advocate for the resources required to support nuclear 
capabilities. Collectively this meant that no one Command in the Air Force had ‘owner-
ship’ of the nuclear mission.21
18 Students at US military academies can request specific career paths at graduation. Students at the top of the 
class are generally posted according to their requests; those at the bottom are largely placed in positions based 
on the needs of the service.
19 Michael Spencer, Aadina Ludin and Heather Nelson, The unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken 
shipment of classified missile components: an assessment (Montgomery, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air 
University, Maxwell Airforce Base, January 2012), https://apps/dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a557097.pdf.
20 Thomas Shanker, ‘Missile parts sent to Taiwan in error’, New York Times, 26 March 2008, https://www.
nytimes.com/2008/03/26/world/asia/25cnd-military.html.
21 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I: The Air Force’s nuclear 
mission, p. 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Phase_I_Report_Sept_10.pdf.
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In response to these fi ndings, the Air Force created the Global Strike Command 
in August 2009, introducing a single command responsibility for the nuclear inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber force. Even though reviving the 
nuclear enterprise became a priority for the Air Force, decades of neglect could 
not be redressed overnight. In 2013, the commander of the ICBM enterprise was 
relieved of command and it was discovered that Air Force offi  cers at Malmstrom 
Air Force Base were cheating on tests involving their mastery of ICBM opera-
tions.22
Most importantly, there was one fact that pointed to an unmistakable trend 
towards disarmament. The numbers of deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons 
in the world were declining. Figure 1 shows the scale and pace of American 
strategic nuclear weapons reductions that have occurred over recent decades.
These reductions have been codifi ed in a series of arms control treaties between 
the United States and Russia, culminating in the so-called ‘New START Agree-
ment’ that entered into force on 5 February 2011; both parties reached the central 
limits specifi ed by that treaty in February 2018. The treaty limits each side to a total 
of 700 deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable 
heavy bombers, and to a total of 1,550 nuclear warheads deployed on these delivery 
systems (each bomber is counted as carrying one nuclear warhead).23 Verifi cation 
22 Bud Fuji-Takamoto, Organizational dysfunction in the US Air Force: lessons from the ICBM community, MA thesis, 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2016, pp. 
38–41, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1030376.pdf.
23 US Department of State, New START, https://www.state.gov/avc/newstart/.
Figure 1: The US nuclear weapons stockpile, 192–2017
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and transparency of the treaty are accomplished by combining elements of the 
verifi cation protocols from the 1991 START Treaty with a series of annual on-site 
inspections, data exchanges and notifi cations related to force structure and facili-
ties. As fi gure 2 demonstrates, each party adopted a slightly diff erent approach to 
meeting the limits specifi ed by the treaty.24
New START still allows the United States and Russia to deploy robust nuclear 
forces. Nevertheless, today’s forces are only a fraction of the approximately 10,000 
nuclear warheads spread across 2,000 delivery vehicles deployed by each side in 
the mid-1980s.25
Sceptics could of course still point to North Korean, Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear tests, modest Chinese, Russian, British, French and even US nuclear 
modernization eff orts, and the fact that this ‘nuclear disarmament trend’ is not 
based on any deliberate scheme or broadly accepted international agreement as 
evidence that nuclear disarmament was a long way off . They might have been 
right. But the sociology and operational profi ciency of the nuclear workforce was 
deteriorating as soldiers and scientists lost interest in the mission, the number of 
deployed weapons was shrinking, and most importantly, nuclear weapons were 
beginning to play a smaller role in several national defence strategies. All these 
trends have continued. The Obama Nuclear Posture Review, the British white 
24 US Department of State, New START.
25 Robbert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2010’, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 66: 4, 2010, pp. 77–83.
Figure 2: US and Russian strategic nuclear forces reported under the New 
START Treaty, 2011 and 201
Source: Hans M. Kristensen, ‘After seven years of implementation, New START Treaty 
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paper on the future of its submarine deterrent, and even the 2011 shooting incident 
aboard the nuclear-armed submarine HMS Astute suggest that sociological and 
political support for a robust nuclear force is deteriorating in some quarters.26 
Moreover, the fact that there is no internationally agreed nuclear disarmament 
plan might not be a showstopper. Just as the Cold War nuclear buildup did not 
unfold according to some well-formed scheme, there is reason to believe that 
the nuclear threat could similarly recede through happenstance. The percep-
tion that nuclear weapons offer a poor response to contemporary security threats 
strengthens the so-called taboo against nuclear weapons use by reducing apparent 
incentives for integrating nuclear weapons into defence policies.27 Nuclear 
weapons that are never deployed cannot be used to break the taboo against the 
use of nuclear weapons. It became possible to imagine that the future of nuclear 
weapons might just come to resemble the situation that formerly pertained to 
chemical weapons—a situation that met a realistic definition of disarmament.
Chemical weapons disarmament: a realistic success
Given that the science of chemistry cannot be erased and that a sophisticated 
chemical industry remains a fixed presence in advanced economies, it is hard to 
imagine how chemical weapons might be completely eliminated and banished 
for ever from the Earth. With that caveat in mind, it was nevertheless possible 
less than a decade ago to state that, politically and militarily, chemical weapons 
disarmament had effectively been achieved. The political and military leaders of 
advanced industrial states had reached the conclusion that the costs of including 
chemical weapons in their arsenals exceeded the tactical, operational and strategic 
benefits that would be gained by their use.28 Chemical weapons require an expen-
sive, hazardous and noxious infrastructure to cover targets that could be destroyed 
more easily and cheaply using nuclear or conventional weapons. The few limited 
target sets for which chemical attack seemed potentially appropriate—for example, 
suppressing flight operations at an airfield with non-persistent chemical agents so 
that its facilities could be occupied and used by friendly forces at a later time—
seemed to offer only weak justification for the expense and hazards involved in 
maintaining chemical weapons. 
This judgement was eventually codified in the 1993 Convention on the Prohi-
bition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and the Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, often referred to as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC). By 2019, 193 states had formally ratified the Convention, 
which bans the use of all toxic chemicals and their chemical precursors in war; 
and 97 per cent of the chemical weapons stockpiles declared under the provisions 
26 Stephen Wright, Ian Drury and Chris Greenwood, ‘Smiling face of sailor pictured just 48 HOURS before 
he “gunned down two of his officers, killing one” on nuclear sub HMS Astute’, Daily Mail, 9 April 2011, 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1374850/HMS-Astute-shooting-Ryan-Donovan-pictured-smil-
ing-48-hours-incident.html.
27 T. V. Paul, The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Nina 
Tannenwald, The nuclear taboo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
28 Richard M. Price, The chemical weapons taboo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
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of the Convention have been verifiably destroyed.29 The Convention is enforced 
by a rigorous on-site inspection and declaration regime that is monitored by the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, based in The Hague.30
Rebecca Hersman and William Pittinos have recently characterized this chemical 
weapons disarmament regime as a ‘system of restraint’ involving four elements: 
a taboo against the use of chemical weapons; norms, treaties and international 
institutions that outlaw possession or use of chemical weapons (e.g. the CWC); 
deterrent threats; and the fact that virtually all militaries did not possess chemical 
weapons and believed that these weapons had virtually no military utility.31 The 
last element in this system—lack of military benefit—actually offers a sufficient 
explanation for the diminishing salience and presence of chemical weapons in 
world politics. All other things being equal, militaries do not possess weapons that 
are deemed to be useless—or, more importantly, that are deemed to be undesir-
able. Hersman and Pittinos recognize this point: if the perception of benefit 
changes, taboos erode, rules can be ignored and deterrence must come into play 
to reinstate a disarmament regime.32
The system of restraint actually emerged in response to isolated instances of 
chemical warfare that highlighted the fact that chemicals were a ‘poor man’s’ 
weapon of mass destruction—low-tech and useful against even less-skilled 
opponents. Saddam Hussein’s murderous regime in Baghdad is a case in point. 
Its use of chemical agents (mustard gas, sarin and possibly tabun) against military 
formations during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88 produced locally devastating 
consequences against unprepared Iranian forces.33 The regime’s use of chemicals 
against civilians also produced horrific consequences: in 1988 Iraqi forces used a 
combination of nerve agents and mustard gas to kill approximately 5,000 Kurdish 
civilians in the town of Halabja in northern Iraq.34 Chemicals were also employed 
as a terrorist weapon. The Aum Shinrikyo (‘Aum Supreme Truth’) religious group 
released sarin in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995, leading to thousands 
of casualties including twelve deaths. Although the group had apparently exper-
imented with relatively sophisticated dispersal devices, in the end they simply 
punched holes in plastic bags full of sarin, which allowed the liquid to evaporate 
and slowly disperse in subway carriages.35 The high volume of passenger traffic in 
confined spaces, along with the panic that erupted after it became apparent that 
the subway lines had been attacked, suggested that it was the nature of the target, 
not the inherent lethality of the agent, that was the critical factor in determining 
the effectiveness and impact of a chemical attack against unprotected civilians. In 
29 Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, 25 Sept. 2005, https://
www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/download-convention.
30 John Hart, ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’, in Eric A. Croddy and James J. Wirtz, eds, Weapons of mass destruc-
tion: an encyclopedia of worldwide policy, technology, and history, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), pp. 93–6.
31 Rebecca K. C. Hersman and William Pittinos, Restoring restraint: enforcing accountability for users of chemical weap-
ons (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 4–8.
32 Hersman and Pittinos, Restoring restraint, p. 7.
33 James Joyner, ‘Iran–Iraq War’, in Croddy and Wirtz, eds, Weapons of mass destruction, vol. 1, pp. 164–6.
34 Brian L’Italien, ‘Halabja incident’, in Croddy and Wirtz, eds, Weapons of mass destruction, vol. 1, pp. 151–3.
35 Jonathan Tucker, ‘Chemical/biological terrorism: coping with a new threat’, Politics and the Life Sciences 15: 2, 
Sept. 1996), pp. 167–94.






/ia/article-abstract/95/4/785/5524995 by guest on 04 July 2019
James J. Wirtz
794
International Affairs 95: 4, 2019
late 2012, after a hiatus of nearly 20 years, another instance of chemical weapons 
use against a civilian population occurred when the Syrian government employed 
sarin against domestic opposition—and repeated the attacks up to August 2013.36
Although these incidents highlight challenges to the global norm against 
chemical weapons use, the international reaction to them provided evidence of 
the system of restraint in action. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the inter-
national coalition assembled to counter Baghdad’s action incorporated ‘counter-
proliferation’ objectives into its plan to force a return to the status quo ante bellum 
and then followed up with international sanctions, inspections and even significant 
air strikes (Operation Desert Fox) to compel Iraq to abandon its nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons activities. This campaign culminated in the Second Gulf 
War, which was justified to a global audience as necessary to stop Iraq’s clandestine 
activities to maintain and/or enhance its unconventional arsenal. By 2010 most of 
the members of Aum Shinrikyo who participated in the chemical attack on the 
Tokyo subway had been convicted by Japanese courts, providing an important 
example of how domestic laws can support international norms against chemical 
use.37 
The lack of an immediate US response to Syria’s initial use of chemical 
weapons caused some political agitation, given President Obama’s statement of 
August 2012 that chemical weapons use was a red-line issue that would lead to an 
American military response.38 Eventually, after a good deal of hand-wringing by 
the international community, the Russian government brokered a deal whereby 
the Assad regime acceded to the CWC in September 2013. The Organization for 
the Prevention of Chemical Weapons then swung into action, working diligently 
to destroy Syria’s arsenal of chemical weapons and precursors. For a moment, it 
even appeared that the events in Syria might have also been an anomaly: the Syrian 
regime appeared to cave in to international pressure, and the threat was quickly 
contained by the international disarmament regime created to eliminate chemical 
weapons. 
By the end of 2013, then, while the system of restraint had indeed faced 
challenges, it appeared that the regime against chemical weapons use was robust. 
Those incidents that had occurred seemed to confirm that chemical weapons had 
limited military utility and were apparently employed only by poor, desperate, 
backward governments or unbalanced individuals against defenceless civilians, 
a target that was itself placed off limits by international law. In other words, 
these incidents actually confirmed the judgement of virtually all governments 
and militaries—that chemical weapons had no real military utility. The incidents 
also demonstrated that the norm against chemical weapons use was in fact clearly 
defined and accepted, that there were a host of mechanisms available to respond 
36 Peter Baker and Michael R. Gordon, ‘US warns Syria on chemical weapons’, New York Times, 4 Dec. 2012, 
p. A8, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/middleeast/nato-prepares-missile-defenses-for-turkey.
html?_r=0.
37 Thirteen members of the cult were executed by hanging in July 2018.
38 Wyn Bowen, Jeff Knopf and Mathew Moran, ‘Coercing Syria on chemical weapons: deterrence, compellence 
and the limits of the “resolve plus bombs” formula’ (unpublished manuscript, April 2019, copy in author’s 
possession), p. 4.






/ia/article-abstract/95/4/785/5524995 by guest on 04 July 2019
Nuclear disarmament and the end of the chemical weapons ‘system of restraint’
795
International Affairs 95: 4, 2019
to violations of the norm, and that governments were willing to take military 
action in response to the use of chemical weapons. Once again, from a practical 
political and military perspective, the regime against chemical weapons proved its 
resilience by weathering several challenges. Chemical weapons had largely been 
discarded by militaries everywhere. Even after their use by the Syrian regime, the 
weapons still had no real political or military salience; and those who violated the 
international norm against chemical use eventually faced an effective international 
or domestic response.
Chemical weapons redux
The disaster that befell the chemical disarmament regime began in 2014 when 
attacks using sarin, chlorine and mustard agents became commonplace during the 
Syrian civil war. Although estimates vary and are the subject of political dispute, 
according to one source 336 separate attacks have occurred involving the employ-
ment of chemical weapons against both military and civilian targets.39 While the 
Syrian government is responsible for the majority of these attacks, the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also used chlorine, mustard gas and other as yet 
unidentified chemical substances on the battlefield. In an even more unexpected 
twist, VX and the so-called Novichok agent have been used in political assassina-
tions.
Hersman and Pittinos highlight the scope of this setback by creating five 
descriptive categories to capture the actors, agents and settings of these incidents. 
The Syrian government, a party to the CWC, used chemical agents on its own 
territory against its own citizens. ISIS, a non-state actor, used chemical weapons 
on the territory of a CWC party (Syria) during a conflict involving chemical 
warfare. ISIS also used chemical weapons in Iraq—that is, on the territory of 
a CWC party. In conducting the assassination of Kim Jong-nam at the Kuala 
Lumpur International Airport, a non-CWC party (North Korea) used a chemical 
agent on the territory of a CWC party. Finally, the Russians (a CWC party) used 
Novichok to assassinate a former Russian intelligence agent and his daughter in 
Salisbury, in the United Kingdom (another CWC party).40
Two generalizations emerge from this group of different actors, agents and 
settings that bode very badly for the future of chemical disarmament in partic-
ular, and the trend towards disarmament in general. First, the militaries, intelli-
gence agencies and non-state actors involved in these incidents all perceived that 
chemical weapons had real utility and could be used to achieve significant strategic 
objectives. The Syrian government’s use of chemicals against rebel groups, for 
instance, enabled it to carry out a highly effective counter-insurgency campaign 
against urban areas that were under the control of the opposition. Although the 
Syrians used chemicals (especially chlorine) against opposing military units in an 
39 Tobian Schneider and Theresa Lutkefend, Nowhere to hide: the logic of chemical weapons use in Syria (Berlin: Global 
Public Policy Institute, Feb. 2019), p. 5.
40 Hersman and Pittinos, Restoring restraint, pp. v–vii.
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effort to deny them access to trenches and fixed, enclosed fortifications, they had 
their greatest strategic impact against civilians. The Syrian opposition discovered 
that, regardless of the advances made on the front line, they could not protect 
civilians in rebel-controlled areas from chemical attack. The use of chorine was 
not especially lethal—approximately 200 civilians were killed in the attacks41— 
but nevertheless, these attacks demoralized rebel supporters and often forced 
them to flee to safer locations, places where they could no longer help to support 
front-line fighters. In an urban environment, chemical attacks allowed the Syrian 
government to literally ‘detach’ rebel forces from the people whose interests they 
were fighting to protect.42 In a ‘Maoist’ sense, chemical attacks drained the civilian 
pond in which the rebels swam; for those partial to Giulio Douhet’s concepts of air 
war, as the general predicted, chemical attacks against a civilian population broke 
the bond between the population, its leaders and its military.43 Although Tobias 
Schneider and Theresa Lutkefend have characterized Syria’s chemical doctrine as 
‘the Damascus School of Counterinsurgency’,44 one could just as easily suggest 
that nearly a century after it was articulated, someone actually operationalized 
Douhet’s notion of using chemical weapons to terror-bomb enemy civilians into 
submission.
Second, it would appear that military organizations were not involved in 
the use of chemical agents as a weapon of assassination. These ‘Wet-Affairs’, to 
borrow a term from Soviet parlance, were apparently orchestrated by unconven-
tional forces or intelligence operatives, organizations that might in fact see greater 
utility in chemical weapons than military officers in conventional organizations. 
The use of chemical agents in assassination could even be depicted as roughly 
akin to a precision drone strike. Instead of being employed in highly permis-
sive, albeit remote environments to target specific individuals, chemicals can be 
employed in less permissive, urban environments. Small quantities of their binary 
form are easy to transport and difficult to detect, are deadly to individuals and 
provide time for operatives to escape while authorities attempt to sort out what 
happened. It appears that paramilitary or intelligence organizations have in fact 
identified a strategically significant mission for chemical agents, a mission that is 
largely beyond the domain of traditional military organizations. Although many 
militaries have walked away from chemical agents, it is possible that other agencies 
within governments see a role for chemical weapons.
Nuclear weapons redux
The overall decline in the number of nuclear weapons deployed worldwide 
and the diminishing salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs actually 
withstood several significant developments since the end of the Cold War. Indian, 
41 Schneider and Lutkefend, Nowhere to hide, p. 13.
42 Schneider and Lutkefend, Nowhere to hide, pp. 26–32.
43 Giulio Douhet, Command of the air (New York: Coward-McCann, 1943). Douhet repeatedly refers to the likeli-
hood of ‘aero-chemical offensives’ and how they could be used to break an opponent’s morale. 
44 Schneider and Lutkefend, Nowhere to hide, p. 26.
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Pakistani and North Korean nuclear tests did not spark changes in other nuclear 
arsenals. For that matter, relatively modest Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons 
modernization programmes did not spark much of a counter-action. US ballistic 
missile defence programmes, intended to counter North Korean and Iranian 
threats, were not particularly welcomed in Moscow or Beijing; nevertheless, they 
failed to provoke much more than verbal condemnation. Insults to international 
nuclear decorum occurred repeatedly, but failed to derail the long-term trends 
evidenced in figure 1 above.
Recent developments in the chemical arena suggest that these insults to nuclear 
decorum had little impact not because of some nascent ‘system of restraint’ in 
the nuclear realm, but because nuclear weapons generally had little salience in 
the overall context of international relations. Now, however, this context may 
in fact be changing, much like the context in the chemical realm. Specifically, 
increasing concerns about the rise of Great Power competition increase the salience 
of nuclear matters. Moscow’s interest in altering the status quo in Europe and 
Beijing’s growing presence in the South China Sea challenge US and allied inter-
ests. Analysts are increasingly concerned that ‘grey zone’ tactics could lead either 
to inadvertent escalation or to more deliberate efforts to present competitors with 
a fait accompli.45 Elbridge Colby, for instance, has noted that Moscow or Beijing 
might be relying on a strategy of presenting the United States and its allies with a 
fait accompli and then relying on nuclear threats to deter a vigorous response.46 It 
is arguable that the ‘stability–instability paradox’, whereby mutual nuclear deter-
rence creates opportunities to use non-nuclear violence to further diplomatic and 
military objectives,47 is envisioned as an element of future relationships among the 
Great Powers. In the light of recent talk about the use of high-altitude nuclear air 
bursts (to create a damaging electromagnetic pulse48) or cyber attacks to cast doubt 
on the reliability of nuclear command, control and communication systems,49 it 
seems the nuclear balance might once again become a salient element in interna-
tional affairs.
Conclusion: the end of the disarmament era?
In hindsight, my own optimism about the trend towards nuclear disarmament 
in world politics was apparently based on the creeping assessment that nuclear 
weapons provided little military benefit. Arms reductions, operational glitches, 
the quest to preserve nuclear infrastructures as a basis for disarmament: all these 
45 Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Grey is the new black: covert action and implausible deniability’, 
International Affairs 94: 3, May 2018, pp. 477–94.
46 Elbridge Colby, ‘Against the Great Power: reflections on balancing nuclear and conventional power’, Texas 
National Security Review 2: 1, Nov. 2018, pp. 145–52, http://dx/doi.org/10.26153/tsw/864.
47 Glen Snyder, ‘The balance of power and the balance of terror’, in Paul Seabury, ed., The balance of power (New 
York: Chandler, 1965), pp. 184–201.
48 William Graham, R. James Woolsey and Peter Vincent Pry, ‘The EMP executive order—where were Bush 
and Obama?’, National Review, 2 May 2019, https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/05/emp-executive-order-
trump-administration-takes-threat-seriously/.
49 Andrew Futter, Hacking the bomb: cyber threats and nuclear weapons (Washington DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2018).
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developments were manifestations of a perception that nuclear weapons were not 
a particularly effective solution to existing threats to national security. Because 
nuclear weapons are political weapons in every conceivable sense of the term, 
when strategic justifications for maintaining a nuclear arsenal become flimsy, or 
military professionals, elected officials and members of the public begin to see 
nuclear weapons as increasingly irrelevant, movement towards reducing their 
role in defence strategies and world politics becomes possible. An optimist might 
have come to believe that a sufficient cause of disarmament—lack of military 
benefit—was beginning to emerge in the nuclear realm. A system of restraint, 
too, was emerging in nuclear matters—the existence of a nuclear taboo has been 
a favourite topic for years—and it was possible to envision an end-state similar to 
the international regime banning chemical weapons.
In hindsight, too, it is clear that optimism about chemical disarmament was 
based on the judgement that these weapons lacked military benefit, a sufficient 
cause for their vanishing from arsenals and being abandoned as an instrument 
of statecraft generally. This notion was so entrenched as conventional wisdom, 
however, that observers in fact failed to acknowledge that there were indeed good 
military uses for chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein had used them to rid himself 
of unwanted Kurdish towns. Someone poisoned Victor Yushchenko with dioxin 
in 2004 (maybe picking the wrong chemical agent?). These incidents were easily 
depicted as anomalies perpetrated by deviants that actually demonstrated the 
fundamental notion that chemical weapons lacked a legitimate military purpose. 
Nevertheless, there were also events that demonstrated that chemical weapons 
might be useful after all.
Today, it is hard to label hundreds of instances of chemical weapons use by 
multiple actors as anomalies. Even though many will continue to dismiss these 
incidents as bizarre aberrations, or quibble about appropriate metrics and the quality 
of available evidence, the world has been shown that non-persistent chemical 
agents offer an ideal ‘crowd control’ weapon to demoralize or silence opposition 
elements in large urban areas. A sarin attack, for instance, while causing virtually 
no collateral damage, will quiet unsettled parts of a city, allowing the ‘authorities’ 
to move in quickly to re-establish control and sending an unmistakable message 
to opposition supporters in other neighbourhoods. Effective against individuals in 
the smallest of quantities, chemicals also offer precision strikes against high-value 
individuals in the densest urban settings, again with minimal collateral damage (as 
long as one properly disposes of any excess).
Sceptics also fail to acknowledge the rising demand for these kinds of military 
capabilities. By 2030, 43 megacities with populations exceeding 10 million (up 
from about 30 in 2017) will probably exist, and by 2030, 75 per cent of the world’s 
people will probably live in cities with at least 1 million inhabitants, up from 
about 50 per cent in 2017.50 To return to the question raised at the beginning of 
this article, one wonders what circumstances will have to change to derail the 
50 United Nations, The world’s cities in 2018 (New York, 2018), https://www.un.org/en/events/citiesday/assets/
pdf/the_worlds_cities_in_2018_data_booklet.pdf.
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decades-long momentum towards nuclear disarmament. Is increasing diplomatic 
and scholarly attention to Great Power competition a sign that nuclear weapons 
are becoming increasingly relevant in defence strategies and world politics? Will 
there be a shift in the nuclear situation as abrupt as the demise of the chemical 
weapons system of restraint?
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